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Abstract: When an investor sues a state for alleged breaches of its obligations under an investment 
treaty or a trade agreement with investment provisions, all that should matter for who wins the case 
are the merits of the claim itself. Alas, investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) does not take 
place in a vacuum. Such cases are decided by a tribunal typically consisting of three arbitrators, 
one each nominated by the two parties while the president is mutually agreed upon. We 
demonstrate that the kind of involvement of these arbitrators in previous ISDS cases matters for 
the case under dispute. Specifically, we show that what we label the president’s pro-investor 
appointment bias – the number of times they have previously been nominated by an investor minus 
the number of times they have represented respondent states – raises the likelihood that an investor 
wins an ISDS case. The same holds for the pro-investor appointment bias of state-appointed 
arbitrators. Given the president’s crucial role, the main implication of our findings is that presidents 
should be drawn from among those who have not systematically represented more one side than 
the other in previous cases. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The widely perceived legitimacy crisis of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is often 
attributed to ad-hoc arbitration tribunals established under the auspices of institutions such as the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which is part of the World 
Bank in Washington, DC. Public debate, notably in Europe, suggests that these tribunals are 
dominated by self-interested arbitrators operating under opaque circumstances. As noted by Rogers 
(2014: 226), “critics hypothesize that investment arbitrators favor their appointing party in a self-
interested effort to increase the likelihood of future appointments.” More problematically still, the 
suspicion is that private arbitrators with considerable interest in serving corporate clients favor the 
claimants and take position against respondent states (Pauwelyn, 2015). In other words, ISDS is 
suspected to systematically favor investors over respondent states. Respondent states with 
relatively low per-capita income and poor governance are expected to be in a particularly weak 
position when multinational corporations bring alleged breaches of commitments made in 
international investment treaties to ‘private’ arbitration (see Behn et al., 2017 for a discussion of 
the economic development bias hypothesis).1 Behn et al. (2017) themselves find a pro-developed 
state rather than anti-developing state bias in their analysis and also find that if poorer states on 
average lose cases this is because such states often have poor governance which is the more 
important predictor of losing the case than their development status. 
By contrast, little to no attention has been paid to the prior experience and what we later on 
define as the appointment bias of arbitrators in ISDS cases. What analysis there is has instead 
mostly focused on their gender (the vast majority of them are men) or whether they come from 
developed countries (the vast majority of them do), none of which we find persuasive as 
explanatory factors. In order to fill this gap, we make use of rich ISDS-related information collected 
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by UNCTAD for 739 investment disputes (as of end-2016). The database informs not only about 
tribunal decisions in favor of private investors or respondent states; it also names the arbitrators 
handling the specific case. We use the case-specific information on the composition of tribunals to 
test the hypothesis that what we label ‘biased’ arbitrators – those who systematically served the 
interests of one particular side in past cases – shape the outcome of ISDS. In particular, we 
hypothesize that ‘biased’ presidents of arbitration tribunals increase the probability of investor wins 
in ISDS. We also hypothesize that the two parties can improve their chances of winning by 
appointing arbitrators who are more biased toward, respectively, respondent states or investors 
(have served more in previous cases on the same side as the one who is appointing them now) and 
by appointing arbitrators who are more experienced (have served on more previous cases, 
independently on which side). 
After reviewing the related literature in Section 2, we derive our hypotheses in Section 3. 
Section 4 introduces our empirical model to test these hypotheses. Our estimation results are 
presented in Section 5. We find that the presidents of arbitration tribunals play an important role 
for ISDS outcomes. The probability of investor wins increases when presidents are ‘biased’ in the 
sense of having predominantly served as claimant-appointed arbitrators in previous cases. 
However, this effect becomes weaker, and in fact disappears, if state-appointed arbitrators are 
extremely experienced, i.e. have been involved in ISDS very frequently before, or if they have an 
appointment history that extremely favors respondent states, i.e., if they have previously 
represented respondent states many times more than investors. The probability of investor wins 
also increases if respondent states appoint arbitrators that have served more claimants than states 
in the past. Finally, there is some evidence that investor wins become more likely if arbitrators 
appointed by claimants are more experienced but there is too much noise in the data for us to be 
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able to reject, on statistical grounds, the null hypothesis of no effect across all robustness test 
models. Section 6 concludes with discussing policy implications of our analysis. 
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
It has become common that international investment agreements – bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) as well as plurilateral trade and cooperation agreements containing investment chapters – 
include binding provisions on investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). These provisions allow 
private foreign investors to evade national courts in the host countries and instead revert directly 
to international arbitration by ad-hoc tribunals, e.g., established under the auspices of the ICSID, 
in order to raise claims for financial compensation against host-country governments that have 
allegedly broken treaty obligations. 
ISDS provisions were widely regarded as a ‘technical’ issue until they first received public 
attention in the wake of controversial ISDS decisions under the umbrella of the North Atlantic Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Neumayer, 2001). A massive surge in public attention followed the 
heated debate on broad-based cooperation agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). In academic research, the major question was whether ISDS 
provisions could help attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to host countries in which deficient 
national institutions appeared to be unable or unwilling to ensure the rule of law.2 The empirical 
evidence on whether ‘legal delegation’ (Allee and Peinhardt, 2010) to international arbitration 
tribunals induces higher FDI inflows has remained ambiguous.3 At the same time, some recent 
studies indicate that FDI inflows are negatively affected once the host country faces compensation 
claims before arbitration tribunals. Allee and Peinhardt (2011: 401) find that “governments suffer 
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notable losses of FDI when they are taken before ICSID.” Focusing on differences in the FDI 
response from BIT-partner and non-partner countries, Aisbett et al. (2017) find that BITs stimulate 
bilateral FDI flows from partner countries only as long as the host country has not previously had 
a claim brought against it to arbitration.4 
According to Allee and Peinhardt (2011), host countries suffer particularly large losses of 
FDI when international arbitration tribunals consider the compensation claims of private claimants 
to be justified. Consequently, it is of considerable relevance for respondent states to know what 
determines the decisions of tribunals in favor of either of the two parties involved in ISDS. 
However, the empirical literature on the determinants of ISDS outcomes is still in its infancy, 
predominantly because the number of disputes with sufficient documentation was fairly small until 
the recent boom of ISDS cases.  
Some authors argue that ISDS generally favors private claimants over respondent states. 
For instance, the analysis of trends in legal interpretation by Van Harten (2012: 214) suggests that 
arbitrators tend to adopt expansive interpretations of contentious issues of jurisdiction, thereby 
leaning to the position of private claimants rather than respondent states. However, Van Harten 
(2012) does not consider actual ISDS outcomes, i.e., tribunal decisions in favor of either of the two 
parties involved.  
As concerns ISDS outcomes, the academic debate has mainly focused on whether 
respondent states at lower levels of economic development and/or with poor governance face 
systematically higher risks of investor wins in ISDS proceedings. According to Franck (2009: 435), 
the development status of respondent states “does not have a statistically significant relationship 
with outcome.” She concludes that ISDS does not discriminate against lower-income countries.5 
Franck (2014) comes to the same conclusion when controlling for the level of democracy, as an 
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indicator of the quality of governance, in the respondent state. In contrast, Pelc (2017) finds that 
richer respondent states fare better in ISDS proceedings and argues that the striking difference to 
Franck (2014) may be due to the larger sample of ISDS cases.6 
Previous empirical research has paid limited attention to the role of arbitrators in shaping 
ISDS outcomes. This represents an important gap since it has been suspected that the defining 
characteristics of ISDS proceedings, notably the “asymmetrical claims structure and absence of 
institutional markers of judicial independence create apparent incentives for arbitrators to favour 
the class of parties (here, investors) that is able to invoke the use of the system” (Van Harten, 2012: 
219).  
Pauwelyn (2015) and Costa (2011) focus on some personal characteristics of ICSID 
arbitrators, comparing them with WTO panelists. Inter alia, they find that relatively few ICSID 
arbitrators are from developing countries (see also Waibel and Wu, 2011). The private sector or 
academia represent the professional background of most ICSID arbitrators, while most WTO 
panelists have a governmental background. Moreover, the share of ICSID arbitrators with legal 
expertise (and a degree in law) is higher than the corresponding share of WTO panelists. It is also 
shown that “the pool or network of ICSID arbitrators is clearly more closed and dense, with a much 
higher repetition rate (…) than that of WTO panelists” (Pauwelyn, 2015: 774f.; see also Costa 
2011). 
Franck (2009) accounts for the ‘development status’ of (presiding) arbitrators in order to 
address concerns that the disproportionate representation of arbitrators from rich Western countries 
biases ISDS outcomes in favor of claimants who are typically based in similarly rich home states, 
sharing Western legal concepts and norms.7 She concludes from her analysis of just about 50 
concluded cases of ISDS that these concerns tend to be unfounded, considering the statistically 
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insignificant link between the development status of presiding arbitrators and ISDS outcomes.8 
Using information on 131 concluded cases, Kapeliuk (2010) provides evidence on ISDS outcomes 
by focusing on the decision patterns of so-called elite arbitrators, somewhat arbitrarily defined as 
having served on at least four ICSID tribunals. Inter alia, the descriptive statistics speak against the 
hypothesis that arbitrators who have been reappointed repeatedly are biased in favor of private 
investors.9 
Langford et al. (2017) provide an interesting social network analysis on the 3,910 known 
individuals involved as arbitrators, counsel, expert witnesses or tribunal secretaries in the 1,039 
investment arbitration cases they analyze. Their particular interest lies in the analysis of so-called 
‘double hatting’, where the same people serve in the same or different roles in multiple sequential 
or even simultaneous cases, which raises potential conflict of interest issues. They show that double 
hatting “is not a common or widespread practice” but instead is “practiced so consistently by a 
highly visible and powerful core of some of the most influential actors in the system” (Langford et 
al., 2017: 328). The authors do not estimate the impact of the individuals’ characteristics on 
arbitration outcomes, hence their study is not directly relevant to ours. However, one inference we 
draw for our own study is that in a robustness test we exclude cases on which arbitrators with the 
highest consolidated experience or appointment bias serve. This allows us to check whether our 
results are driven by a similar core set of a few individuals. 
By accounting for arbitrators and the legal counsel of investors and states in a multiple 
regression analysis of the determinants of ISDS outcomes, Franck and Wylie (2015) is more closely 
related to our empirical analysis below.10 Their analysis provides only weak evidence that 
arbitrators matter for ISDS outcomes.11 This may be partly due to the still relatively few 
observations as Franck and Wylie miss the particularly large number of newly initiated ISDS cases 
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since 2012.12 More importantly perhaps, the coverage of personal traits of arbitrators focuses on 
the tribunal’s gender composition and ‘development status’ (as defined above), rather than the 
experience of arbitrators and whether they have systematically represented more one side than the 
other in the past. As we explain in more detail in Section 3, we address this limitation by 
constructing case-specific measures of the experience and what we call ‘appointment bias’ of all 
three arbitrators. In assessing the importance of these measures for ISDS outcomes, we also account 
for conditional effects, e.g., by interacting the personal traits of different arbitrators involved in a 
specific case. 
 
3. THE IMPACT OF THE APPOINTMENT BIAS AND EXPERIENCE OF ARBITRATORS ON ISDS 
OUTCOMES 
In this section, we develop hypotheses regarding the effect that the involvement of arbitrators in 
previous cases has on ISDS outcomes. To explain our reasoning, it is important to introduce readers 
to the database we draw on, namely UNCTAD’s database on ISDS which included 739 cases by 
the end of 2016 (http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS). The database provides case-
specific information on the private claimant and the respondent state, the economic sector of the 
dispute, the year when the case was filed for international arbitration, the current status, and the 
outcome for concluded cases. While some cases of ISDS date back to the early 1990s, it was only 
in 2003 that the number of new disputes exceeded 30 for the first time. Throughout the period of 
observation, 471 cases have been concluded; 257 were still pending by end-2016.13  
Crucially, the database provides information on the arbitrators constituting the ad-hoc 
tribunals. Typically, three arbitrators are involved in each case: one arbitrator is appointed by the 
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private claimant, another one is appointed by the respondent state, and the third serves as the 
president. Only if a party fails to appoint their arbitrator will the arbitrator be designated to them 
by the arbitrating institution (Puig, 2014).14 The president is normally appointed by mutual 
agreement between the two parties though they can also be appointed by the arbitrating institution, 
particularly so if the two parties cannot agree on a president. Ideally, we would thus have 2,217 
observations on arbitrators (739 cases x 3 arbitrators). However, 388 observations (17.5%) are 
missing. A large share of the missing observations (34%) concerns cases that were still pending, 
most probably because tribunals had not yet been established; 41% of missing observations relate 
to cases that were settled or discontinued, most probably before arbitrators were appointed. 
Importantly, missing observations are relatively few for cases decided in favor of either the investor 
or the respondent state.  
Some of the 426 arbitrators named in the database performed all three functions – i.e., as 
president, as a representative of the claimant, and as a representative of the respondent state – 
during the period of observation. 11% of all arbitrators fall into this group.15 However, most 
arbitrators specialized and performed just one function. About half of all arbitrators were active 
exclusively as representatives of either claimants or respondent states.  
We presume that the two party-appointed arbitrators tend to serve the interests of the party 
they are representing. To be clear: all arbitrators, including those appointed by the parties, are 
required to be impartial and independent and they cannot be biased in a legal sense as otherwise 
they are by law required to withdraw from the case (Puig, 2014; Frank and Wylie, 2015). However, 
that does not mean that they are neutral or disinterested. Clearly, the parties appoint certain 
individuals and not others with certain expectations regarding them. Individuals can be known or 
suspected to tend toward investor interests or toward respondent state interests in their view of the 
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world and their interpretation of contested issues without them being biased in a legal sense, just 
like candidates for the Supreme Court in the United States and elsewhere are known to tend toward 
conservative or liberal viewpoints. As Kapeliuk (2010: 67) argues, an arbitrator is “often selected 
due to his or her perceived predisposition to a party and its legal position”. More cynically, party-
appointed arbitrators may also tend to serve their party’s interests in order to maximize the chances 
that they will be appointed again by, respectively, the same or other investors or the same or other 
respondent states (Rogers, 2014).  
Based on our presumption that the other two arbitrators tend to serve the interests of the 
party they are representing, we hypothesize that the presidents of tribunals play a critically 
important role in deciding on investor-state disputes. As Langford et al. (2017: 304) have put it: 
“(…) the president of an arbitration represents the most prestigious role in arbitration, possesses 
the most responsibility in case management, and exercises the most influence in the final decision 
as they are usually not appointed solely by one party”. Presidents set the agenda, impact upon the 
style of arbitration, decide on procedural issues and mediate between the two party-appointed 
arbitrators (Franck, 2009: 443f.).  
Arguably, presidents are most likely to be neutral toward either party when they have not 
served as the representative of either claimants or respondent states in previous cases. A relatively 
large number of presidents belong to this group (34% of all presidents; see Figure 1). However, the 
average number of 1.7 cases over which this type of president presided is considerably smaller than 
for all other types. The second largest group of 47 presidents has previously represented both 
claimants and respondent states in other cases. This group presided over 54% of all cases, i.e., each 
president in this group handled 7.1 cases on average. The remainder consists of those who have 
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previously represented only claimants (27) or only respondent states (34). This group handled 32% 
of all cases, thus presiding on average over 3.2 cases. 
Based on the case-specific composition of arbitration tribunals and the history of previous 
cases, we define two characteristics of each arbitrator in a tribunal, namely what we call (pro-
investor) appointment bias and experience. We define appointment bias as the number of previous 
cases an arbitrator has served as an investor’s appointee minus the number of previous cases the 
same arbitrator has served as a respondent state’s appointee, whereas experience is defined as the 
accumulated number of cases the arbitrator has been involved in, no matter on what side or as 
president.  
Our particular focus is on the characteristics of arbitrators that serve as presidents in a 
particular case. We hypothesize that presidents who represented more often investors than states in 
the past (i.e., who are biased toward investors in our definition) are more likely to find the case in 
dispute in favor of the investor. Similarly, party-appointed arbitrators with stronger bias in favor 
of claimants should, all other things equal, increase the chances of the claimant winning the dispute. 
Exactly because arbitrators appointed by parties are chosen for a reason, we agree with Waibel and 
Wu’s (2011) and Puig’s (2014) argument that repeated appointment by one of the parties can serve 
as a proxy variable for their otherwise unobserved tendency to prefer one party over the other in 
the face of legal disputes.  
As for arbitrators’ experience, as Ashenfelter (1987: 342) notes, “a key determinant of the 
parties’ preferences for an arbitrator is usually the extent of the arbitrator’s ‘experience’ in deciding 
related arbitration cases.”16 More specifically, the comparison of ICSID arbitrators and WTO 
panelists by Pauwelyn (2015) suggests that “experience and track record” are relatively important 
selection criteria in ISDS, explaining the higher repetition rates of party-appointed ICSID 
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arbitrators. We therefore hypothesize that the more experienced the investor-appointed arbitrator 
is the more likely is an outcome in favor of the investor in the disputed case. The opposite holds 
for the experience of the state-appointed arbitrator. Moreover, we additionally hypothesize that 
well experienced state- or investor-appointed arbitrators can mitigate or strengthen the effect that 
the appointment bias of presidents has on arbitration outcomes. Their accumulated expertise should 
help them increase the probability that the outcome is in favor of their client despite the president’s 
appointment bias in the direction of the investor or the state. The same goes for greater (pro-
investor) bias in party-appointed arbitrators, which should reinforce any effect that president bias 
has. By contrast, the president’s experience (as opposed to bias) is not expected to have an effect 
since experience itself does not suggest that a president is inherently more inclined to decide in 
either party’s favor.  
In sum, we test the following hypotheses on the effects of the arbitrators’ experience and 
appointment bias on the outcomes of ISDS: 
H1 (main hypothesis): The president’s appointment bias is hypothesized to be critically important 
for ISDS outcomes. The decisions of arbitration tribunals are more likely to be in favor of private 
investors when the president has been appointed relatively more by claimants than by respondent 
states in the past, and vice versa.  
H2: Similarly, if the party-appointed arbitrators are more biased toward the claimant this also 
increases the chances of the claimant winning the dispute, and vice versa. 
H3: Tribunal decisions are more likely to be in favor of private investors if claimant-appointed 
arbitrators are more experienced and less likely in favor of private investors if state-appointed 
arbitrators are more experienced. 
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H4: The experience and bias of party-appointed arbitrators condition the effect of the president’s 
appointment bias on ISDS outcomes. Specifically, state-appointed arbitrators with more experience 
and negative pro-investor bias (i.e., stronger bias toward respondent states) are expected to mitigate 
the impact of the president’s bias in favor of private investors. Conversely, claimant-appointed 
arbitrators with more experience and stronger bias toward investors are expected to exacerbate the 
impact of the president’s bias in favor of private investors. 
 
4. DATA AND ESTIMATION MODEL 
As mentioned in the previous section, we have coded our data from UNCTAD’s database on ISDS. 
In some contrast to the impression given in public debate, of the 471 concluded cases, tribunal 
decisions were more often in favor of respondent states (173 cases) than in favor of private 
investors (125). Arguably, it was also in the interest of respondent states that 48 cases were 
discontinued, particularly when tribunals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.17 The 
remaining 114 cases have been settled among the parties of the dispute. 
To test our hypotheses we code a dependent variable that is set to one for ISDS cases 
decided in favor of the claimant, i.e., the private investor, and zero for cases decided in favor of the 
respondent state as well as for discontinued cases. It is typically in the interest of respondent states 
when arbitration tribunals dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction or cases are discontinued for 
other reasons. This coding is also consistent with UNCTAD’s own classification. However, we 
perform a robustness test in Section 5 by excluding discontinued cases from state wins. 
Furthermore, we also estimate ordered logit models which consider settled cases as a third and 
discontinued cases as a fourth outcome category. 
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The appointment bias and experience of the three arbitrators handling a specific case 
represent our explanatory variables of principal interest. Appointment bias and experience are not 
systematically correlated with each other so we include both characteristics simultaneously in all 
estimations. To control for the generally rising trend of arbitrators’ experience built into our 
measure and any temporal trend in appointment biases, we include period-specific fixed effects of 
typically three years into all estimations.18 
In addition, we include a number of control variables capturing potentially important 
characteristics of respondent states as well as the home countries of the claimants. On the 
respondent state side, we account for the country’s GDP and GDP per capita. Economically large 
and rich respondent states can afford to invest more in their legal defense which may lower the 
chances of investor wins. Since arbitration tribunals may be less inclined to decide against 
respondent states with high quality national institutions, we include a measure of the respondent 
state’s rule of law. As argued by Schultz and Dupont (2015: 1160), one of the “functional effects 
of investment arbitration is that it serves to make up for deficient rule of law in the host state.” The 
panel analysis of Freeman (2013) suggests that a larger number of ISDS cases are brought against 
countries with relatively weak domestic institutions that could have ensured property rights and the 
rule of law.19  
On the part of claimants, private investors may have better chances to win when they are 
based in rich and large home states because such states are suspected to push for treaties with 
stronger investor protection (Allee and Peinhardt, 2014; Simmons, 2014). We therefore control for 
the GDP and GDP per capita of the country in which claimants are located. We also include two 
dummy variables to take into account that investor wins may be more likely when the claimant is 
based in the European Union or, alternatively, in one of the NAFTA member countries. Investors 
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based in these two country groups account for most outward FDI stocks and also for the largest 
shares of all ISDS cases throughout the period of observation. The governments of advanced FDI 
source countries in Europe and America had a particularly strong interest plus the necessary 
bargaining power to conclude IIAs offering strong protection of investors which could have 
improved their chances to win disputes. The appendix lists summary variable statistics (Table A1). 
Finally, to account for unobserved heterogeneity across the economic sectors in which claimants 
operate, we include sector fixed effects in all estimations. For similar reasons, we include dummy 
variables for the type of treaty that gives rise to ISDS (bilateral investment treaty, NAFTA, Energy 
Charter treaty, other) and for the arbitration institution that handles the ISDS case (UNCITRAL, 
ICSID, ICSID AF20, other).  
Given the binary nature of our dependent variable (investor wins or not), we employ logit 
estimation though we show in the robustness test section that our results are robust toward using 
probit or a linear probability model instead. Subsequently, we augment the estimation model by 
interaction terms in order to account for the conditional effects predicted by our fourth hypothesis. 
Since with non-linear estimators like the logit the existence of conditional effects cannot be reliably 
inferred by assessing the statistical significance of the interaction term coefficient (Ai and Norton, 
2003), we evaluate these models by plotting predicted marginal effects. 
As a caveat, we acknowledge that we cannot identify causality in our study based on 
observational data. It is possible that some factor omitted from our estimation model is correlated 
with our experience variables of interest and has an independent effect on our outcome variables. 
For example, it could be that well organized and well financially equipped investors are inherently 
more likely to win an ISDS case and have recourse to more experienced arbitrators.21 We see less 
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reason for similar concern regarding our appointment bias variables but equally cannot exclude the 
possibility of spurious correlation in this regard either. 
 
5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Before we present the results from our logit estimations, we discuss some stylized facts that provide 
a first descriptive overview of arbitrator appointment bias and experience. Table 1 provides period 
averages for our case-specific measures of arbitrators’ experience and appointment bias. The 
evidence for all cases of ISDS in column (1) indicates that respondent state-appointed arbitrators 
are slightly more experienced, on average, than claimant-appointed arbitrators and presidents. 
What is more, state-appointed arbitrators are more strongly biased toward respondent states in their 
prior appointment history than claimant-appointed arbitrators are biased toward private investors. 
This is striking insofar as public debate on ISDS focuses almost exclusively on the partisanship 
and self-interest of claimant-appointed arbitrators. Compared to the appointment bias of party-
appointed arbitrators, the appointment bias of presidents is much weaker on average. This was to 
be expected, recalling that both parties have to agree on the president. All the same, on average 
presidents were biased somewhat in favor of claimants meaning that they have served more often 
as claimant-appointed arbitrators than state-appointed arbitrators in previous cases. 
Figure 2 reveals that strong appointment bias of arbitrators is not a common phenomenon 
in ISDS proceedings (see also Nunnenkamp, 2017). Taken together, the appointments of all three 
types of arbitrators are unbiased or just slightly biased in 54% of all cases, defined as the difference 
between the number of previous appointments by claimants and the number of previous 
appointments by respondent states to be just one or minus one. This share is particularly high for 
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presidents (62%). Nevertheless, it may be problematic for respondent states that the appointment 
bias of presidents of arbitration tribunals is more often in favor of claimants than in favor of states 
(143 versus 84 cases). Claimants and respondent states were represented by more strongly biased 
arbitrators in a similarly large number of disputes and, not surprisingly, the bias is in their direction: 
respondent states tend to appoint arbitrators that more often represented states than claimants in 
past cases and vice versa for arbitrators appointed by claimants.  
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 point to some striking differences in terms of arbitrators’ 
experience and appointment bias between cases decided in favor of the claimant and cases decided 
in favor of the respondent state. First of all, the president’s appointment bias toward the claimant 
appears to be relatively strong for cases decided in favor of the claimant. Second, the experience 
and appointment bias of arbitrators representing the state are relatively weak in such cases. Third, 
and most surprisingly perhaps, the experience and appointment bias of arbitrators representing the 
claimant are slightly weaker, rather than stronger, in cases decided in favor of the claimant.  
 
Baseline estimation results 
Descriptive statistics provide first insights but only a multivariate estimation model can test our 
hypotheses. Table 2 presents results from our baseline model. Model 1 includes the experience and 
bias measures for all three sets of arbitrators, model 2 additionally includes the respondent state 
and claimant’s home state control variables. In model 1, we find that only the appointment bias of 
the tribunal’s president exerts a statistically significant effect. It is in the expected direction: the 
more often presidents had been appointed by claimants in previous cases relative to having been 
appointed by states, the more likely it is that claimants win the case under observation (and vice 
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versa for greater appointment bias toward respondent states). This provides evidence in favor of 
our first hypothesis. 
Including control variables in model 2 confirms the statistically significant effect of the 
president’s appointment bias from model 1. In addition, we now find statistically significant effects 
in the expected direction for the appointment bias of state-appointed arbitrators and the experience 
of claimant-appointed arbitrators, while neither the appointment bias of claimant-appointed 
arbitrators nor the experience of the state-appointed arbitrator have a statistically significant effect. 
This therefore only partially supports our third hypothesis.  
According to the average marginal effect based on model 2, an increase in the appointment 
bias of the tribunal’s president by one standard deviation is associated with an increase in the 
likelihood of an investor win, which is on average 38 per cent, by 8.2 percentage points.22 An 
increase in the experience of the claimant-appointed arbitrator by one standard deviation is 
associated with an increase in the likelihood of an investor win by 6.5 percentage points. An 
increase of state appointed arbitrators’ bias towards investors by one standard deviation is 
associated with increasing the chance of an investor win by about 13.5 percentage points.  
As concerns the control variables, with one exception we find no statistically significant 
effects. Most notably, the risk of investor wins in international arbitration of investment disputes 
does not appear to be higher for respondent states with relatively low GDP per capita. Broadly in 
line with Franck (2014) and Behn et al. (2017) we find that the risk of investor wins in international 
arbitration is lower for respondent states with better national institutions to enforce the rule of law. 
Most likely, this is because international arbitration tribunals are more inclined to deny jurisdiction 
and suspect ‘frivolous’ litigation by private investors for respondent states that adhere to the rule 
of law domestically.23  
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Conditional effects 
To test our fourth hypothesis, we now include interaction terms to account for possible conditional 
effects. In models 3 and 4, results for which are reported in Table 3, we interact the president’s 
appointment bias with, respectively, the experience and appointment bias of respondent state-
appointed arbitrators. As we mentioned before, in non-linear models conditional effects cannot be 
simply inferred by assessing the sign and statistical significance of interaction term coefficients. 
We therefore plot the predicted average marginal effects of the president’s appointment bias across 
the range of the conditioning variables based on models 3 and 4 in Figure 3. The top left graph in 
Figure 3 reveals that the marginal effect of the president’s appointment bias on the likelihood of 
an investor win increases with increasing appointment bias of the state-appointed arbitrator. 
However, it is clear from this graph that only appointing an arbitrator with an extremely low value 
on (pro-investor) appointment bias makes a difference, that is, appointing an arbitrator who has 
many more times represented a respondent state than an investor in the past. In fact, at the 5th 
percentile of appointment bias of the state-appointed arbitrator the positive effect of the president’s 
appointment bias disappears. By contrast, for the most part of the relevant range of the conditioning 
variable there is no change to the marginal effect of the president’s appointment bias. A similar 
picture emerges for the conditioning effect stemming from the experience of state-appointed 
arbitrators, as the top right graph in figure 3 reveals. Only appointing the most experienced of 
arbitrators can make the positive effect of the president’s appointment bias disappear.  
In models 5 and 6, also reported in Table 3, we interact the president’s appointment bias 
with, respectively, the experience and appointment bias of claimant-appointed arbitrators. The 
bottom left graph in Figure 3 shows that, contrary to expectation, the marginal effect of president 
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bias decreases rather than increases with increasing bias of the claimant-appointed arbitrator. 
However, the marginal effects of the president’s appointment bias are never statistically 
significantly different across the relevant range of claimant-appointed arbitrator bias. Finally, the 
bottom right graph in Figure 3 reveals that the experience of the claimant-appointed arbitrator also 
exerts no conditioning effect on the president’s effect. 
In sum, we only find very limited support for our fourth hypothesis: respondent states can 
mitigate the detrimental effect of president bias on the likelihood that investors win an arbitration 
case by appointing extremely experienced arbitrators or those with extreme negative appointment 
bias, that is, a previous appointment history in favor of respondent states. We find no statistically 
significant evidence for other conditioning effects. 
 
Robustness tests 
In this sub-section, we subject our estimation results to a number of robustness tests, results for 
which are reported in Table 4. Given the limited evidence for conditional effects, we focus on the 
robustness of our baseline model instead. For ease of comparison, the baseline model 2 (with other 
control variables included) from Table 2 is shown again in column (1) of Table 4. 
In models r1 and r2, we follow Behn et al. (2017) and employ alternative governance 
measures. Specifically, in model r1 we use the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG’s) 
investment profile index to assess a respondent state’s ability to provide adequate protection to a 
foreign investor’s property rights. In model r2 we employ ICRG’s index on bureaucratic quality as 
bureaucracies that are impartial and more efficient should be better able to oversee laws and 
regulations than bureaucracies where drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government 
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services are more frequent. Interestingly, only the indicator for property rights protection has a 
negative and highly significant association with the probability of investor wins in international 
arbitration whereas the estimated coefficient of a respondent state’s bureaucratic quality is not 
statistically significant.  
In model r3, we use an alternative definition to our preferred definition of appointment bias 
of arbitrators. Our preferred definition has pro-investor appointment bias increasing in the 
difference in the actual number of times an arbitrator has previously been appointed by an investor 
minus the actual number of times he has previously been appointed by a respondent state. One can 
alternatively define pro-investor appointment bias as increasing in the relative share of times an 
arbitrator has previously been appointed by an investor minus the number of times he has 
previously been appointed by a respondent state.24 In this robustness test, we therefore divide our 
appointment bias variable by an arbitrator’s experience score, thus creating an alternative relative 
appointment bias variable that runs from -1 (always having served respondent states in past 
appointments) to 1 (always having served investors). Even with these alternative definitions, we 
find that the relative appointment biases of the state appointed arbitrator and of the president have 
the expected positive and statistically significant effect, which is entirely consistent with our 
baseline model results though the coefficients are not directly comparable across these two 
estimation models of course.  
Returning to our preferred definition of appointment bias, in model r4 we no longer 
consider the appointment bias and experience separately for each of the three arbitrators. Instead, 
we use a ‘consolidated’ measure of appointment bias for the arbitration tribunal as a whole, by 
summing up the biases of the three individual arbitrators. The modified measure of experience is 
given by the difference between the claimant-appointed arbitrator’s experience and the state-
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appointed arbitrator’s experience.25 As can be seen, the coefficient on the consolidated appointment 
bias is statistically significantly positive, if only at the 10% level, consistent with the baseline 
model in which the biases of the president and the respondent state-appointed arbitrator had 
positive effects. The modified measure of experience does not reach statistical significance at 
conventional levels. 
In models r5 and r6, we return to the standard measurement of the appointment bias and 
experience for individual arbitrators. However, we exclude cases of ISDS with extraordinarily high 
and low values of the modified measure of experience (model r5) or the consolidated measure of 
appointment bias (model r6). Specifically, we exclude cases with the highest and lowest five 
percent of modified experience or consolidated appointment bias in order to test whether our 
baseline results were driven by outliers. Next, we exclude cases brought against the richest 
respondent states. In model r7, all countries classified as high-income by the World Bank for the 
majority of years in our sample period are dropped. ISDS cases initiated prior to 2002 are excluded 
from model r8.26 In model r9 we modify the definition of state wins. We exclude cases that were 
discontinued and consider only those cases as state wins that were explicitly decided in favor of 
respondent states by the arbitration tribunals. In model r10 we employ multiple imputation to 
impute missing values of arbitrator’s experience and bias, which results in an increase in 
observations from 289 to 341.  
Strikingly, we find that the effects of the appointment bias of the president and of the state-
appointed arbitrator are robust across all these variations to our baseline model specification.27 The 
consolidated appointment bias of model r4 is of course not directly comparable to the baseline 
model but is also statistically significant with the expected positive sign. The effect of the 
experience of the claimant appointed arbitrator does not vary much across model specifications 
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and would thus be robust in the definition introduced by Neumayer and Plümper (2017) but its 
statistical significance is sensitive to model specification. We infer from this that we cannot, on 
statistical grounds, reject the null hypothesis of no effect with sufficient confidence across model 
specifications.  
We report further robustness tests in Table 5. In models r11 and r12 we estimate, 
respectively, a linear probability and a probit model. Results are practically identical in terms of 
sign and statistical significance of coefficients. The coefficients are not comparable across the 
models in substantive terms. If we calculate marginal substantive effects for one standard deviation 
increases in explanatory variables we find that the results are very similar. We therefore conclude 
that our findings do not depend on the logit estimator.  
Lastly, in the remaining robustness test models reported in Table 5 we redefine our 
dependent variable. So far we have used a binary dependent variable of investor wins versus state 
wins. We now include ISDS cases that were concluded by settlements among the parties as an 
intermediate outcome category. In an additional estimation, we also distinguish between major 
wins and minor wins to account for the fact that even if an investor wins a case, it may not get close 
to what it had originally claimed for in terms of financial compensation. We create three ordered 
dependent variables. The first one consists of three categories and is ordered along the combined 
state win plus discontinued cases; settlement; and, finally, investor win dimension (model r13). 
The second one consists of four categories and is ordered along the state win; discontinued case; 
settlement; and, finally, investor win dimension (model r14). The third one consists again of four 
categories but this time ordered along the combined state win plus discontinued cases; settlement; 
minor investor win (defined as investor receives less than the median of the amount awarded as 
share of the amount claimed); and, finally, major investor win (defined as investor receives an 
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award that is equal to or greater than the median of the amount awarded as share of the amount 
claimed) dimension (model r15).28  
Consequently, we estimate three variants of an ordered logit model suitable for ordered 
outcome dependent variables. Such models depend on the validity of what is known as the 
proportional odds or parallel regression assumption. A Wald test developed by Brant (1990) fails 
to reject the proportional odds or parallel regression assumption for the model as a whole as well 
as for each variable separately with few exceptions.29 As in the baseline estimation model, we find 
that the outcomes of international arbitration are more likely to be in favor of private investors and 
less likely to be in favor of respondent states if the president of the tribunal is biased toward the 
claimant and if the claimant-appointed arbitrator is more experienced. The effect of the 
appointment bias of the state-appointed arbitrator becomes marginally statistically insignificant in 
model r13 but on the whole our baseline model results are again robust across these additional 
permutations to the baseline model specification.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
If whether investors win or lose in investor-state dispute settlement were dependent merely on the 
merit of the investor’s claim against the respondent state, the composition of the arbitration tribunal 
would not matter. The prior experience of arbitrators as well as whether they have represented in 
previous cases relatively more the side of the respondent state or the side of the investor would be 
of no significance. Alas, our analysis demonstrates that this is not the case. Given the president’s 
crucial veto power, we have argued that what we call their ‘appointment bias’, defined as the 
number of times they have previously represented an investor in ISDS cases minus the number of 
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times they have represented a respondent state in such cases, should increase the odds that the 
investor wins its case. Our empirical analysis of all concluded ISDS cases in UNCTAD’s database 
has corroborated this hypothesis across and therefore independent of multiple ways of specifying 
our estimation model. This suggests that presidents are not as neutral as they should be. Having 
served more the interests of one party over the other in the past suggests they prefer an investor’s 
over a respondent state’s standpoint in relevant matters of legal dispute since we see no other reason 
why this particular prior experience should otherwise impact the outcome of the case in which they 
now serve as president. We find the same effect for the appointment bias of state-appointed 
arbitrators, but interestingly not for the appointment bias of claimant-appointed arbitrators.  
By contrast, on the whole we find no statistically significant evidence that experience 
matters independently of model specification though in some estimations we have found that more 
experienced claimant-appointed arbitrators – those who have served on more prior ISDS cases, 
independently on which side – help investors win their case. The experience of the respondent 
state-appointed arbitrator, by contrast, was found not to have any independent effect. However, 
appointing arbitrators with extreme experience helps respondent states to mitigate the detrimental 
impact that a biased president has on their own chances to win the case. The same goes for 
appointing arbitrators with extreme negative appointment bias, that is, with an appointment history 
tilted toward having represented respondent states more than investors. 
The immediate implications for the two parties of ad-hoc investment arbitration are clear. From the 
investor’s perspective, seek to agree with the respondent state on a president who has previously 
represented many more times an investor than a respondent state. From the respondent state’s 
perspective, the opposite holds for the appointment of presidents. Whilst appointing an extremely 
experienced arbitrator on their side or an arbitrator with an appointment history very much tilted 
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toward respondent states helps mitigate the impact of a president with an appointment bias in favor 
of investors, clearly it is better to avoid a biased president in the first place.  
From an outsider’s viewpoint, our results would call for avoiding appointment bias, 
particularly in the crucial position of president, and mitigating its effects on ISDS decisions. This 
policy implication might be addressed in several ways. Greater transparency, e.g., by following the 
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration adopted by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in July 2013, may provide a first step to 
alert the parties involved (and also the general public) about potential conflicts of interest of 
arbitrators.30 Consequently, the selection of arbitrators may receive more attention in the future, 
notably by respondent states that appear to have neglected selection issues in the past. Rogers 
(2014) observed that many parties of the ICSID convention, especially relatively poor respondent 
states, waived their right to make nominations to the list of arbitrators and, thereby, strengthen their 
influence on the composition of arbitration tribunals.  
Stricter codes of conduct for arbitrators could provide another step in the direction of 
avoiding biased ISDS decisions. While all arbitrators are already required to be independent and 
impartial, “with the large number of new cases, the disclosure requirements for ICSID arbitrators 
might usefully be expanded” (ICSID Secretariat, 2004: 12). In order to mitigate bias, it appears to 
be particularly important to require arbitrators “to disclose, not only any past or present 
relationships with the parties, but more generally any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to the arbitrator’s reliability for independent judgment” (ibid: 13). While data constraints 
prevented us from addressing so-called double hatting of arbitrators, where the same people serve 
in the same or different roles in multiple sequential or even simultaneous cases, in conjunction with 
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appointment bias, this issue clearly deserves greater attention in codes of conduct addressing 
potential conflicts of interest.31 
More controversially, it has been argued that biased ISDS decisions would be easier to 
avoid if ad-hoc investment tribunals were replaced by a permanent investment arbitration court. 
For instance, van Harten (2012: 218) favors a permanent court over ad-hoc arbitration because of 
“certain institutional safeguards of judicial independence such as secure judicial tenure, objective 
methods of appointment of judges to specific cases, and restrictions on outside remuneration by 
the judge.” However, as discussed in more detail by Rogers (2014), a court system would not 
necessarily resolve biased ISDS decisions. As mentioned above, candidates for any court, including 
the Supreme Court in the United States, tend to have different viewpoints, including on so-called 
frivolous litigation by private investors or excessive market interventions by the state. Hence, just 
like ad-hoc tribunals, permanent investment courts may tend toward investor interests or toward 
respondent state interests – especially if it is realistically assumed that the judges sitting in the 
permanent court were drawn from the “highly visible and powerful core of some of the most 
influential actors in the [current] system” (Langford et al., 2017: 328). Therefore, our empirical 
findings may suggest a more practical solution: the creation of a pool of potential candidates who 
can function as presidents drawn from those and only those who have not systematically over-
represented investors or respondent states in previous cases.  
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1 See also the discussion in Gallagher and Shrestha (2011) and Schultz and Dupont (2015). Conflicts of interest, 
favoring investors, and a lack of transparency are supposed to encourage ‘strategic litigation’ (Pelc, 2017), which aims 
not only at obtaining financial compensation for alleged breaches of treaty obligations by the respondent state but also 
at deterring the regulation of business activities by host-country governments. The mere fear of being sued and ending 
up on the losing side may result in ‘regulatory chill’, that is, states shying away from regulatory measures and policies 
for fear of being dragged by foreign investors before a private arbitration tribunal (Neumayer, 2001). 
2 A related literature discusses investment treaties as a possible solution to investor-state hold-up problems. See 
Markusen (2001) or Turrini and Urban (2008).  
3 See, for instance, Berger et al. (2011, 2013) and the literature given there. 
4 According to Wellhausen (2015), the negative effects of disputes are limited to FDI flows from the particular source 
country where the foreign investor raising the claim is based. 
5 See Gallagher and Shrestha (2011) for a critical assessment of Franck’s (2009) analysis and conclusions. 
6 However, the focus of Pelc (2017) is on whether the recent trend toward strategic litigations and so-called indirect 
expropriations, rather than direct takings, can explain why the win rates of private claimants declined over time. See 
also Schultz and Dupont (2015) for descriptive statistics suggesting that higher-income countries have better chances 
to fend off compensation claims in ISDS proceedings. 
7 As discussed in more detail in Behn et al. (2017), this reasoning is based on Posner and De Figueredo (2005) who 
report in the context of the International Court of Justice that judges are more likely to vote for a disputing state that 
shares a similar level of economic development with the judge’s home state. Judges are supposed to be ‘sympathetic’ 
with comparable states and/or to consider shared interests of home states with similarly advanced states. 
8 In contrast, Behn et al. (2017) report a significantly positive effect of the GDP per capita of the presiding arbitrator’s 
home state on the probability of investor wins. The sample underlying the ordered logit model of Behn et al. is much 
larger than that of Franck (2009). 
9 Kapeliuk (2010) also finds no evidence supporting the view that arbitrators render compromise awards, by ‘splitting 
the difference’ with regard to claims for financial compensation, in order to maximize their chances of reappointment 
in future cases of ISDS. It should be noted, however, that the evidence is largely based on just 43 of the 131 concluded 
cases – namely those with involvement of elite arbitrators (105) having been finally resolved by a publicly known 
award on the merits. 
10 In addition, Waibel and Wu (2011) perform multiple regressions on the determinants of ISDS outcomes in an 
unpublished working paper. They account for the personal background of arbitrators as well as repeated appointments 
by claimants or respondent states. Inter alia, Waibel and Wu (2011) find that arbitrators (notably, the presidents of 
tribunals) with a career in the private sector and with repeated appointments by claimants are more likely to affirm 
jurisdiction, i.e. accepting the case for the tribunal to decide on its merits. In contrast to our analysis below, Waibel 
and Wu do not distinguish between the arbitrators’ experience and bias on a case-by-case basis. 
11 In contrast, the investors’ identity and the expertise of the parties’ lawyers appear to be more important. 
12 Franck and Wylie (2015) include awards that were publicly available by the end of 2011. As a result, the number of 
observations underlying the reported regressions is about 50-100.  
13 The current status was unknown for 11 cases; another 11 cases were concluded but the arbitration tribunal’s decision 
was “in neither party’s favor”, i.e., the tribunal found a liability but awarded no damages. 
14 Our database does not allow us to distinguish between those appointed by parties and those dedicated to them. 
15 In a few cases, arbitrators are listed as the “sole arbitrator” in the database. In some other cases, the function of 
arbitrators is “unknown.” Note that these listings count for an arbitrator’s experience, i.e., the number of cases being 
involved in any function (see below). 
16 See also Bloom and Cavanagh (1986) for an analysis of arbitrator selection. 
17 Jurisdiction may be denied, for instance, when the tribunal finds that the investor’s asset does not constitute a 
‘covered investment’, that the claimant is not a ‘covered investor’, or that the dispute arose before the relevant 
investment treaty entered into force or falls outside the relevant ISDS provisions (UNCTAD, 2016). See also Schultz 
and Dupont (2015) who define state wins as arbitral decisions that either decline jurisdiction or deny the investor any 
compensation. 
18 The first period consists of two years only. We do not include year-specific fixed effects since some years see only 
investor wins or only state wins. These cases would be dropped due to multicollinearity between the year-specific fixed 
effects and the dependent variable in these years.  
19 In contrast, Pelc (2017) argues that most disputes no longer result from direct takings by host countries with weak 
rule of law but from policy regulations (so-called indirect expropriation) in democratic states with relatively strong 
institutions. 
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20 “ICSID AF” refers to the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, applying to disputes that fall outside the scope of the 
ICSID Convention (e.g. if one of the involved parties is not an ICSID member state or a national of an ICSID member 
state). For details see: https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/ICSID-Additional-Facility-Rules.aspx 
21 We are grateful for an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
22 Average marginal effects are marginal effects estimated for each observation at its observed value and then averaged.  
23 Interestingly, if we exclude the respondent state’s rule of law as an explanatory variable, its per capita income 
becomes statistically significant. Plausibly, therefore, a finding that poorer states are more likely to lose ISDS cases 
spuriously picks up the effect of weak institutions on ISDS case winning. 
24 This relative appointment bias measure is not our preferred measure because it will give the same appointment bias 
score to an arbitrator who has previously been appointed only once, namely by one party, as to an arbitrator who has 
previously been appointed many times by this party (and never by the other). In our view, relative appointment bias 
has low construct validity since it does not capture the theoretical rationale behind measuring appointment bias, namely 
that repeated appointment by one of the parties can serve as a proxy variable for their otherwise unobserved tendency 
to prefer one party over the other in the face of legal disputes. 
25 As argued in Section 3, the president’s experience should not play an unconditional role for tribunal decisions in 
favor of either party. The baseline results are in line with this reasoning. 
26 Note that our measures of experience and bias take relatively low values by construction in the early periods of our 
analysis when the number of ISDS was still relatively small. 
27 Adopting the formal definition and measure of effect robustness of Neumayer and Plümper (2017), we find that the 
estimated degree of robustness for the average marginal effect of the appointment bias of the respondent state is always 
at least 0.8 (except in model r6 where it is 0.45) and for the average marginal effect of the president’s appointment 
bias it is always at least 0.8.  
28 We lose a few observations in this model as the share awarded relative to the original claim could not be established 
in all investor win cases. 
29 In models r13 and r15, the appointment bias of the state appointee fails to meet the parallel regression assumption 
test. If we re-run these models with multinomial logit, which does not depend on the parallel regression assumption, 
we find that this variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on investor wins (model r13) and both major 
and minor investor wins (r15) but a negative (and statistically insignificant) effect on the probability of a settlement in 
both models. 
30 UNCITRAL rules require the disclosure of a wide range of information submitted to and issued by investment 
tribunals. Furthermore, UNCITRAL finalized and adopted the Mauritius Convention on Transparency in July 2014. 
This convention supplements existing treaties with respect to transparency-related obligations; it “establishes a 
mechanism through which all parties to existing investment treaties can efficiently and effectively update the 
procedural rules governing investor-State arbitrations under those treaties so as to effectively implement the 
Transparency Rules and better take into account the public interest nature of these disputes” (Johnson, 2014: 2). 
31 As noted by García-Bolívar (2010: 5), some arbitrators have been challenged recently because there were doubts 
about their independent judgment: “In most cases where those challenges were made, the arbitrators served as legal 
counsel in other investment treaty cases. Most of these challenges have not been successful.” 
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TABLE 1 ‘Experience’ and ‘Bias’ of presidents and party-appointed arbitrators 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All cases Decided in favor of: Discontinued 
 Claimant Respondent state 
Presidents:     
Bias 0.63 1.15 0.44 -0.38 
Experience 7.61 5.37 6.12 5.56 
Observations 622 121 160 32 
Arbitrators representing claimants:     
Bias 3.15 1.57 2.03 2.53 
Experience 7.74 4.86 5.38 6.81 
Observations 608 113 147 32 
Arbitrators representing states:     
Bias -5.84 -1.42 -3.82 -4.22 
Experience 8.72 4.00 6.09 7.41 
Observations 599 113 147 32 
Note. Experience = accumulated number of cases involved in any function up to year t-1; Bias = accumulated number 
of cases involved by representing claimants minus accumulated number of cases involved by representing respondent 
states, up to year t-1. Settled and pending cases as well as cases without information on the current status and cases 
decided in favor of neither party are included in ‘All cases.’ 
Source: UNCTAD, ISDS database. 
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TABLE 2 Baseline results 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Experience state appointee 0.0277 0.0507 
  (0.0345) (0.0363) 
Experience claimant appointee 0.0418 0.0452* 
  (0.0271) (0.0267) 
Experience president -0.0144 -0.0253 
  (0.0284) (0.0304) 
Appointment bias state appointee 0.0594 0.0883** 
  (0.0426) (0.0427) 
Appointment bias claimant appointee -0.0780 -0.0707 
  (0.0502) (0.0516) 
Appointment bias president 0.149** 0.133** 
  (0.0620) (0.0670) 
ln GDPpc respondent state   0.0300 
    (0.234) 
ln GDP respondent state   -0.0718 
    (0.121) 
Rule of law respondent state   -0.903*** 
    (0.253) 
ln GDPpc investor home   -0.0878 
    (0.322) 
ln GDP investor home   0.0768 
    (0.119) 
EU investor dummy   -0.164 
    (0.509) 
NAFTA investor dummy   -0.743 
    (0.683) 
Observations 290 289 
Note. Period, sector and treaty and institution dummies included in all 
estimation models. Constant included but not reported. Statistical 
significance at the one, five, and ten percent level is indicated by ***, ** 
and *, respectively.   
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TABLE 3 Conditioning effects 
  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Experience state appointee 0.0481 0.0820** 0.0485 0.0506 
  (0.0398) (0.0336) (0.0374) (0.0364) 
Experience claimant appointee 0.0410 0.0436 0.0449* 0.0456* 
  (0.0270) (0.0268) (0.0272) (0.0272) 
Experience president -0.0312 -0.0299 -0.0319 -0.0257 
  (0.0280) (0.0311) (0.0316) (0.0310) 
Appointment bias state appointee 0.0795* 0.113*** 0.0864* 0.0884** 
  (0.0455) (0.0393) (0.0445) (0.0428) 
Appointment bias claimant appointee -0.0587 -0.0696 -0.0452 -0.0703 
  (0.0523) (0.0543) (0.0550) (0.0520) 
Appointment bias president 0.202*** 0.254*** 0.188** 0.137 
  (0.0771) (0.0882) (0.0766) (0.0885) 
ln GDPpc respondent state 0.0619 0.0207 0.0360 0.0301 
  (0.237) (0.233) (0.235) (0.234) 
ln GDP respondent state -0.0852 -0.0610 -0.0766 -0.0725 
  (0.123) (0.119) (0.124) (0.122) 
Rule of law respondent state -0.924*** -0.944*** -0.910*** -0.902*** 
  (0.258) (0.263) (0.250) (0.254) 
ln GDPpc investor home -0.0861 -0.0457 -0.0693 -0.0876 
  (0.322) (0.333) (0.318) (0.322) 
ln GDP investor home 0.0703 0.0634 0.0561 0.0756 
  (0.116) (0.117) (0.114) (0.117) 
EU investor dummy -0.175 -0.147 -0.149 -0.166 
  (0.509) (0.520) (0.502) (0.510) 
NAFTA investor dummy -0.681 -0.642 -0.678 -0.741 
  (0.677) (0.694) (0.665) (0.681) 
Bias president * Bias state appointee 0.0170**       
  (0.00747)       
Bias president * Experience state appointee   -0.0158***     
    (0.00605)     
Bias president * Bias claimant appointee     -0.0207   
      (0.0129)   
Bias president * Experience claimant appointee       -0.000496 
        (0.00642) 
Observations 289 289 289 289 
Note. Period, sector and treaty and institution dummies included in all estimation models. Constant included 
but not reported. Statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent level is indicated by ***, ** and *, 
respectively. 
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TABLE 4 Robustness tests 1 
  baseline r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10 
Experience state appointee 0.0507 0.0289 0.0286 0.00239   0.0548 0.0227 0.0474 0.0611 0.0482 0.0394 
  (0.0363) (0.0396) (0.0394) (0.0214)   (0.0390) (0.0443) (0.0399) (0.0385) (0.0365) (0.0343) 
Experience claimant appointee 0.0452* 0.0456 0.0536 0.0257   0.0985** 0.0578* 0.0493* 0.0434 0.0466 0.0377 
  (0.0267) (0.0336) (0.0338) (0.0198)   (0.0443) (0.0342) (0.0281) (0.0280) (0.0285) (0.0265) 
Experience president -0.0253 -0.0541 -0.0565 0.00535   -0.0155 -0.0156 -0.0237 -0.0196 -0.0309 -0.0227 
  (0.0304) (0.0358) (0.0350) (0.0239)   (0.0329) (0.0346) (0.0324) (0.0319) (0.0308) (0.0277) 
Bias state appointee 0.0883** 0.126** 0.110** 0.633**   0.133*** 0.179*** 0.0821* 0.0996** 0.0787* 0.0632* 
  (0.0427) (0.0498) (0.0471) (0.308)   (0.0452) (0.0555) (0.0463) (0.0452) (0.0424) (0.0376) 
Bias claimant appointee -0.0707 -0.0789 -0.0835 -0.261   -0.119* -0.118 -0.0439 -0.0532 -0.0696 -0.0558 
  (0.0516) (0.0569) (0.0542) (0.373)   (0.0676) (0.103) (0.0597) (0.0533) (0.0519) (0.0489) 
Bias president 0.133** 0.197** 0.183** 1.222***   0.160** 0.196** 0.144* 0.124* 0.107* 0.113* 
  (0.0670) (0.0771) (0.0745) (0.419)   (0.0817) (0.0790) (0.0749) (0.0701) (0.0641) (0.0679) 
Consolidated experience         -0.0134             
          (0.0194)             
Consolidated bias         0.0445**             
          (0.0226)             
ln GDPpc respondent state 0.0300 0.00678 -0.0891 0.103 0.0693 0.279 0.360 0.155 -0.0196 0.0376 -0.0290 
  (0.234) (0.215) (0.230) (0.212) (0.204) (0.215) (0.236) (0.252) (0.260) (0.240) (0.207) 
ln GDP respondent state -0.0718 0.0259 0.112 -0.0834 -0.123 -0.183 -0.166 -0.145 -0.122 -0.0566 -0.102 
  (0.121) (0.141) (0.132) (0.111) (0.108) (0.120) (0.132) (0.134) (0.139) (0.121) (0.108) 
Rule of law respondent state -0.903***     -0.907*** -0.900*** -1.049*** -1.071*** -1.046*** -1.118*** -0.861*** -0.898*** 
  (0.253)     (0.255) (0.236) (0.286) (0.277) (0.292) (0.300) (0.260) (0.242) 
Property rights respondent state   -0.252***                   
    (0.0760)                   
Impartial bureaucracies respondent state     -0.332                 
      (0.262)                 
ln GDPpc investor home -0.0878 -0.180 -0.208 -0.110 -0.107 -0.201 -0.271 0.106 -0.0416 -0.0595 0.0256 
  (0.322) (0.306) (0.308) (0.305) (0.297) (0.348) (0.344) (0.353) (0.339) (0.349) (0.308) 
ln GDP investor home 0.0768 0.127 0.118 0.0527 0.0640 0.178 0.0744 0.109 0.0850 0.0541 0.0601 
  (0.119) (0.140) (0.136) (0.116) (0.117) (0.138) (0.126) (0.135) (0.132) (0.118) (0.111) 
EU investor dummy -0.164 -0.444 -0.344 -0.0578 -0.0775 0.182 0.135 -0.273 -0.203 -0.226 -0.224 
  (0.509) (0.534) (0.519) (0.480) (0.460) (0.538) (0.524) (0.561) (0.551) (0.535) (0.485) 
NAFTA investor dummy -0.743 -1.030 -0.652 -0.468 -0.579 -0.576 -0.321 -0.946 -0.613 -0.676 -0.885 
  (0.683) (0.715) (0.710) (0.653) (0.642) (0.712) (0.685) (0.747) (0.745) (0.707) (0.666) 
Observations 289 245 245 289 289 259 259 234 251 254 341 
Note. Period, sector and treaty and institution dummies included in all estimation models. Baseline is model 2, Table 2. In models r1 and r2, alternative governance measures are used. In model r3, a 
relative measure of appointment bias is used. In model r4, consolidated measures for bias and experience are used. In models r5 and r6, cases with the highest and lowest five percent of consolidated 
experience or bias are excluded. In model r7, high-income respondent states are dropped. Model r8 excludes ISDS cases initiated prior to 2002. In model r9 discontinued cases are no longer considered 
as state wins. In model r10, we impute missing values of arbitrator’s experience and bias. Constant included but not reported. Statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent level is indicated 
by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 Robustness tests 2 
  baseline r11 r12 r13 r14 r15 
Experience state appointee 0.0507 0.0101 0.0304 0.0392 0.0459 0.0437 
  (0.0363) (0.00700) (0.0205) (0.0295) (0.0292) (0.0278) 
Experience claimant appointee 0.0452* 0.00715 0.0251 0.0261 0.0261* 0.0218 
  (0.0267) (0.00496) (0.0159) (0.0162) (0.0151) (0.0165) 
Experience president -0.0253 -0.000963 -0.0166 -0.00578 -0.00848 -0.00935 
  (0.0304) (0.00437) (0.0178) (0.0210) (0.0180) (0.0215) 
Appointment bias state appointee 0.0883** 0.0151** 0.0490** 0.0495 0.0611* 0.0544* 
  (0.0427) (0.00749) (0.0236) (0.0311) (0.0313) (0.0289) 
Appointment bias claimant appointee -0.0707 -0.0122 -0.0403 -0.0347 -0.0312 -0.0342 
  (0.0516) (0.00937) (0.0292) (0.0253) (0.0237) (0.0277) 
Appointment bias president 0.133** 0.0164** 0.0827** 0.0982** 0.0730* 0.0781* 
  (0.0670) (0.00644) (0.0390) (0.0449) (0.0384) (0.0435) 
ln GDPpc respondent state 0.0300 0.00951 0.00558 0.0559 0.0652 0.108 
  (0.234) (0.0460) (0.130) (0.178) (0.173) (0.192) 
ln GDP respondent state -0.0718 -0.0118 -0.0442 -0.0413 -0.0479 -0.0505 
  (0.121) (0.0230) (0.0688) (0.0916) (0.0904) (0.102) 
Rule of law respondent state -0.903*** -0.170*** -0.528*** -0.813*** -0.763*** -0.891*** 
  (0.253) (0.0477) (0.144) (0.198) (0.194) (0.211) 
ln GDPpc investor home -0.0878 -0.0205 -0.0542 -0.117 -0.0517 -0.0195 
  (0.322) (0.0622) (0.181) (0.214) (0.189) (0.216) 
ln GDP investor home 0.0768 0.0116 0.0468 0.0799 0.0879 0.0334 
  (0.119) (0.0218) (0.0672) (0.101) (0.0896) (0.0931) 
EU investor dummy -0.164 -0.0216 -0.0962 -0.210 -0.383 -0.0150 
  (0.509) (0.0966) (0.286) (0.364) (0.329) (0.365) 
NAFTA investor dummy -0.743 -0.124 -0.457 -0.843 -0.990** -0.813 
  (0.683) (0.130) (0.389) (0.547) (0.495) (0.531) 
Brand global chi2 test (p-value)    0.268 0.501 0.127 
Observations 289 289 289 361 361 353 
Note. Period, sector and treaty and institution dummies included in all estimation models. Model r11 is estimated with 
a linear probability model. In model r12 probit is used. In model r13, the dependent variable consists of three categories 
and is ordered along the combined state win plus discontinued case; settlement; and, finally, investor win dimension. 
In model r14, the dependent variable consists of four categories and is ordered along the state win; discontinued case; 
settlement; and, finally, investor win dimension. In model r15, the dependent variable consists of four categories and 
is ordered along the combined state win plus discontinued cases; settlement; minor investor win; and, finally, major 
investor win dimension. An investor win is coded as major (minor) if an investor gets >=p(50) (<p(50)) of the amount 
awarded as share of the amount claimed. Models r11 and r12 include constant but not reported. Statistical significance 
at the one, five, and ten percent level is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.   
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1 Summary variable statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Investor win (baseline dependent variable) 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Experience state appointee 5.51 9.13 0 62 
Experience claimant appointee 5.37 7.62 0 35 
Experience president 5.86 6.87 0 31 
Bias state appointee -2.96 8.01 -57 10 
Bias claimant appointee 1.92 4.20 -6 27 
Bias president 0.61 3.25 -27 10 
ln GDPpc respondent state 8.74 1.06 5.37 11.00 
ln GDP respondent state 25.61 1.74 20.46 30.37 
Rule of law respondent state -0.25 0.85 -2.08 1.81 
ln GDPpc investor home 10.46 0.60 7.99 11.58 
ln GDP investor home 28.02 1.83 22.22 30.41 
EU investor dummy 0.49 0.50 0 1 
NAFTA investor dummy 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Note. N=289. 
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FIGURE 1 Number of presidents performing other functions and number of cases they have been 
involved in as president (based on 162 presidents and 622 cases with information on president) 
 
a) Number of presidents b) Number of cases 
 
           
Source: UNCTAD, ISDS database. 
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FIGURE 2 Distribution of ISDS cases according to bias of arbitrators  
 
Source: UNCTAD, ISDS database. 
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FIGURE 3 Predicted effect of president’s bias conditioned by bias and experience of party-
appointed arbitrators 
 
 
 
Note. On the x-axis, percentiles of the conditioning variable are shown, respectively.  
 
